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CodeVoting: protecting against malicious vote
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Abstract. Voting in uncontrolled environments, such as the Internet
comes with a price, the price of having to trust in uncontrolled machines
the collection of voter’s vote. An uncontrolled machine, e.g. the voter’s
PC, may be infected with a virus or other malicious program that may
try to change the voter’s vote without her knowledge. Here we present
CodeVoting, a technique to create a secure communication channel to
a smart card that prevents vote manipulation by the voter’s PC, while
at the same time allows the use of any cryptographic voting protocol to
cast the vote.
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1 Introduction
Internet voting can be classified as dangerous because the voter votes in an
uncontrolled environment. Therefore the voter is vulnerable to coercion/vote
selling and the voter’s PC is vulnerable to the Internet threats, such as virus,
worms, spyware and malware.
There is much work on coercion/vote selling problem [2–9] but, of our knowl-
edge, few on the insecurity of voter’s platform. The work on coercion free voting
systems follows two main approaches. The first one is the use of a secure and
secret communication channel between the voter and a trusted party of the vot-
ing system, allowing the voter to cheat on the coercer. Depending on the voting
system, such secure and secret communication channel can be required prior to
or on the election’s day. The second main technique used to prevent coercion
is allowing the voter to vote several times. Therefore, since usually the list of
voters who voted is public, the only real coercion possible that gives the coercer
100% of guarantees is to coerce the voter to abstain.
We understand that coercion and vote selling is a potential big problem on
Internet voting systems. However, we consider that the use of insecure voters’
platforms can have a potential higher risk to the elections integrity. We base our
opinion on three reasons.
– First, the coercion in large scale, involving possible thousands of voters, is
quite unlikely to pass undetected.
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– Second, with all the security flaws on operating systems and applications,
it is easy to write a virus that would foul the voter on election’s day and
change her vote to a predefined vote.
– Third, we believe that writing a virus and disseminating it would be cheaper
and more difficult to traceback to the authors than a coercion/vote selling
of a thousand voters, therefore more appealing to an attacker.
CodeVoting addresses some problems of the insecure voter’s platform, namely
automatic vote manipulation. CodeVoting can be seen as a rearrangement of the
ideas presented by Chaum [1] (SureVote). SureVote allows the voter to vote using
secret vote and reply codes. These secret codes allow the voter to detect if anyone
changed the vote code during the voting process. However, if there is at least
one corrupted entity, SureVote does not guarantee that in the counting phase
the vote code is translated to the right candidate.
CodeVoting reuses the idea of voting with codes. However, the idea of Code-
Voting is to use the codes just as a user interface and not as the entire voting
protocol. In CodeVoting we suggest the use of a smart card to translate the
vote code to the candidate code. Additionally, we propose the use of the smart
card as a trusted party that will participate in a cryptographic voting protocol
in behalf of the voter. The use of a cryptographic voting protocol can give the
voter guarantees that the voter’s vote is counted correctly.
Other proposals to provide a secure voting environments are by Zu´quete et
al. [11], where the authors propose the use of a special hardware with secure
input and output that the voter uses with her PC, and by Volkamer et al. [10],
where the authors propose to use trusted computing technology to provide a
”controlled” and secure voting environment.
In the next Sect. we will describe in more detail the vote modification attacks.
Then, in Sect. 2 we describe how to use CodeVoting to securely cast a vote.
Finally, we evaluate CodeVoting in Sect. 4 and conclude in Sect. 5.
2 CodeVoting
The key pieces of CodeVoting are the VoterCard and the CodeCard. The Code-
Card is just a paper card with the vote codes printed on it. We will explain later
how to get the CodeCard. The VoterCard is a smart card, which will be used to
translate the vote codes into a real vote for a specific candidate. The VoterCard
is given to the voter at the voters’ registration process.
For the voter the voting process is quite simple. The voter just uses a Code-
Card to translate the candidate code into a vote code.
For example, a voter with the ballot and CodeCard of Fig. 1 wishes to vote
for candidate D she will enter WL764 as the vote code.
Every voter will have a different CodeCard, therefore different vote codes
for the same candidate. Each CodeCard is associated to a VoterCard, which
is responsible for the translation of the code to the candidate. Only the voter
and the VoterCard should know the codes written on the CodeCard. Therefore,
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Fig. 1. Example of a ballot (on the left) and a CodeCard (on the right).
CodeVoting protects against a malicious voting application trying to change the
voter’s vote.
After translating the vote code to the candidate code any voting protocol
can be used to cast the vote. One solution is using the VoterCard to process the
candidate code accordingly to the cryptographic voting protocol and submit the
vote. Another alternative is to create an unchangeable vote and pass it to the
voting client application running on the voter’s PC so it can proceed with the
voting protocol.
When the VoterCard receives a confirmation of a successful vote delivery it
releases the confirmed vote delivery code, assuring the voter that her vote was
successfully delivered.
Based on this overview of CodeVoting the reader can easily understand that
CodeVoting is a kind of a user interface plugin to a voting system that can
protect the voter’s choice from manipulation.
2.1 CodeCard
The CodeCard is just a paper card with codes printed on it. There should be
one CodeCard per VoterCard so that every voter votes with different codes.
The voter should be the only one with access to the codes of her CodeCard to
prevent manipulation of her vote. Consequently we have a problem to solve: how
to create the CodeCard, associate it with the VoterCard and give it to the voter
without leaking the codes.
We propose to generate each voter’s CodeCard within the VoterCard. This is
a good option because the CodeCard becomes automatically associated with the
correspondent VoterCard and no other entity besides the VoterCard has access
to the codes on the CodeCard. However, we still have the problem of how to
secretly print the CodeCard, i.e. how to give it to the voter without leaking the
codes. We think the best idea is to have a certified CodeCard printing machine
available at the local authorities’ offices. Since the codes are generated inside
the VoterCard the printing machine would be very simple. It would consist only
of a smart card reader, a keypad (for inserting the PIN of the VoterCard and
unlock it) and a small printer. We believe that such a simple hardware could be
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easily certified and sealed to ensure the secrecy of the codes printed. With the
CodeCard printing machines certified and in place a voter could go to any local
authority office to generate a CodeCard for her VoterCard. For privacy reasons
the printing machine should be inside a private booth, similar to the ones used
for traditional paper based voting.
2.2 How to achieve trust on the VoterCard?
Reading the description of CodeVoting, the reader quickly understands that
CodeVoting relies on the correct behaviour of the VoterCard. Therefore one can
ask: CodeVoting is designed to protect the voter from the insecure voter’s PC,
but what guarantees are given that the VoterCard does in fact do what it is
supposed to do? One way to verify that the VoterCard does in fact what it is
supposed to do is to test it. Besides testing the VoterCards in the production
phase we believe that would be good to have additional random testing by an
independent certification authority.
Additionally we can make voters also part of the certification process. It
could be possible for a voter to verify her VoterCard by running a fake election
with instant results sometime before the real election.
Nevertheless, one can point out that the application running inside the Voter-
Card is somehow able to detect that is being subject to a test, and therefore it
will act properly in the tests but it will still change the voters vote on the
real election day. To prevent this scenario one must be sure of the software
running inside the VoterCard. Fortunately, smart cards support signed applica-
tions. Therefore, and because it is possible to know which software is inside the
VoterCard by verifying its signature, it is possible to use open source certified
software. Of course, we can also have certified applications running on a PC.
However, since it is possible for an attacker to take control of the voter’s PC,
a signed application does not guarantee correct behaviour. On the other hand,
it is not possible to take control over the smart card. Therefore, an open source
signed application can guarantee correct behaviour.
As an outcome of the last two paragraphs, we defend that the use of soft-
ware running inside a smart card can offer much higher guarantees of correct
behaviour than the software running in an insecure/uncontrolled platform such
as the voter’s PC.
3 Vote modification attacks
A vote modification attack can be performed in two ways: i) changing the vote
to a predefined candidate or ii) changing the vote to a random candidate. While
the first attack is more powerful the second may be easier to prepare in advance.
By other words, to change a vote for a predefined candidate one must have the
knowledge of which candidate one wants to change the vote to, while to change
the vote to a random candidate there is no need to know the candidates in
advance.
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If one wants to boost the votes on candidate A it is preferable to perform
an attack to directly changing the votes to votes on candidate A. On the other
hand, if one wants the decrease the votes for candidate B, in an area known
to be much favourable to candidate B, it is enough to perform a random vote
modification attack.
Another kind of vote modification attack is to force abstention. In this attack
the attacker just has to fake a successful vote delivery. In many voting systems
this can be done just by presenting the message ”Your vote was successfully
delivered. Thank you for voting..
4 Evaluation
We defend that CodeVoting protects against vote manipulations at the voter’s
PC under the following assumptions: i) the CodeCard is generated in a secure and
controlled environment by the VoterCard (the voter is the only person there),
ii) the voter keeps her CodeCard secret, and iii) the correspondence between the
candidate and its code (letter) cannot be changed. The last assumption can be
achieved by publicly exposing the ballot or by any other technique that prevents
a ballot change, such as using an image hard to forge/modify as a ballot.
Under these assumptions changing a vote to a predefined candidate is virtu-
ally impossible because the corresponding vote code is not known by the attacker
and the probability of guessing the correct vote code, with 5 alphanumeric sym-
bols, is 1 in 365, i.e. less than 1 in 60 million. A random candidate change attack
has almost the same probability of success as the previous attack. If we have n
candidates running for the election the probability of guessing a random valid
vote code is n− 1 in 365.
The other possible attack is to fool the voter into believing that she cast
a vote, while in reality no vote was cast. To prevent such attack we propose
the use of another code to confirm vote delivery. The VoterCard only releases
this code after getting a confirmation that the vote was successfully delivered,
e.g. could be a message signed by the election server. Therefore, if we use a
confirmed vote delivery code with the same length of vote codes, this attack
has the same probability of success than the attack of changing the vote to a
predefined candidate.
If the voting system does not allow a voter to cast several votes there is also
a possible attack to the voters’ trust on the voting system. The attack goes as
follows: the attacker lets the voter successfully cast a vote and then change the
valid confirmed vote delivery code to a fake one. The voter would think that
something wrong had happened, however there was nothing wrong. Then the
voter would try to vote again and the voting system replies that the voter had
already voted and, of course, the voter will protest. If the voting system allows
the voter to cast several votes this attack would not be a problem.
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5 Conclusions and future work
Internet voting is subject to many dangers, namely vote selling, coercion and
vote manipulation by malicious software. While the first two dangers have been
subject of much research the last one was not. Here we presented CodeVoting, a
solution that with the help of a trusted smart card prevents vote manipulation in
an uncontrolled environment. However, there are still some issues to deal with,
such as large candidates list and CodeCard reuse.
Large candidate list are a big issue when considering the real application of
CodeVoting. As proposed, the CodeCard must have an entry for each possible
candidate. If we consider elections with a large number of candidates, lets say
above twenty, the size of the CodeCard starts to become to large and usability
problems may arise.
Another issue is the CodeCard reuse. If a voter uses the same CodeCard in
more than one election it is possible for an attacker to replace the voter’s vote
by a random one. To be able to perform this attack the attacker must collect
the codes used on the first election and be in control of the PCs used by the
voter in both elections. If the voter uses different PCs to vote it will be much
harder to perform the attack. This attack can be easily prevented if the voter
generates a new CodeCard for each election. However, if the elections are running
simultaneously this may be harder.
Concluding, we believe that CodeVoting can be successfully used to prevent
vote manipulation in uncontrolled environments, however additional work must
be done to solve the large candidate list and CodeCard reuse issues. Addition-
ally, it would be interestingly to study alterative solutions to print and secretly
delivering CodeCards to voters.
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